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Governing Knowledge Societies:  
Competing Models and Norms 
 
1. Introduction 
Competing models and norms that underpin academic and policy discussions 
about the challenges of governing information or knowledge societies are 
discussed in this paper. These discussions have intensified since the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva in 2003 and Tunis in 2005. 
During the WSIS there was a consensus around the idea that societies which 
become increasingly reliant on digital technologies and their applications should 
be people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented. The WSIS Declaration of 
Principles envisaged societies in which: 
 
‘everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, 
enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in 
promoting their sustainable development and improving their quality of life, 
premised on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
(UN/ITU, 2003: 1).  
  
It was and remains relatively easy to claim that there is agreement about these 
principles. It is far more difficult to understand why it is very challenging to 
ensure that policy and practice adhere to these principles. Adherence to these 
principles means that developments in information or knowledge societies 
should be respectful of human rights, and consistent with economic growth as 
well as with reducing inequality within societies around the world. The next 
section (section 2) of this paper highlights persistent asymmetrical power 
relations that make it extraordinarily difficult to ensure that developments in 
knowledge societies are aligned with the aspirations of the WSIS Declaration of 
Principles. This discussion is followed in section 3 by a concise review of the 
normative foundations and value preferences that inform contending 
instrumental and critical models of knowledge societies development.  A 
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discussion of why it is so difficult to align policy and practice with the norms and 
values embraced by proponents of critical alternative models follows in section 4. 
The paper concludes (section 5) with an assessment of the role of scholarly 
research in devising strategies to guide policy and practice in ways that are 
aligned with the goals of achieving greater equity in knowledge societies.  
 
2. Persistent Asymmetries of Power in Policy and Practice 
With the passage of time since the WSIS it is clear from discussions within most 
of the post-WSIS follow-up forums that the development of knowledge societies 
must enhance opportunities for all people, be consistent with improving their 
quality of life, and facilitate sustainable development (UNCTAD, 2015).  On the 
highest level of abstraction, there is little disagreement.  The ‘devil is in the 
detail’; as always, problems arise in negotiating the politics of implementation.  
On the level of practice, there is evidence that the principles agreed as 
appropriately underpinning knowledge societies developments are not being 
extensively adhered to (Mansell, 2015; Marcelle, 2013). In my report on 
knowledge societies in 1997 for the United Nations Commission for Science, 
Technology and Development (CSTD), we insisted that ‘assembling the “tools” is 
only part of the task … Measures must be taken to assemble the human 
capabilities and related technologies to make the best use of the new 
opportunities offered by ICTs’ (Mansell & Wehn, 1998: 261). This was not a 
particularly new insight then, but it continues to evade many of those who are 
promoting knowledge societies.  The tendency in policy debate is to default to 
discussions about financing digital infrastructure and services – promoting 
broadband or mobile phones - without sufficient regard for the livelihoods of 
those who are affected by the presence or absence of digitally mediated 
communication.  
 
In many policy forums when inequality and instances of injustice in knowledge 
societies are discussed, lists of priorities for action and of threats are typical.  
Digital priorities might, for example, include broadband access, inclusiveness, 
internet governance, education, cybersecurity, the cloud economy, social and 
economic value and regulatory issues, sustainability (e-waste), and the need for 
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forward looking and more easily measureable targets.  Digital threats might 
include cybercrime, online pornography, online violence against women and 
girls, monopolies in the digital sector, corporate invasion of individual privacy 
and tax avoidance.  These lists come from a WSIS + 10 meeting and were 
presented at the 18th Session of the UN Commission for Science and Technology 
for Development (UNCSTD) which received a comprehensive report on progress 
towards the WSIS goals (UNCTAD, 2015).  In spite of lists like these pointing to 
areas where action is needed to achieve a better distribution of the benefits of 
digital technologies and their application, when it comes to practice, hierarchies 
of knowledge are repeatedly found to be entrenched and capacity building for 
achieving the potential benefits of knowledge societies is often biased in favour of 
the needs of market-based commercial ventures. 
 
This consequence of asymmetrical power will not surprise critical scholars. But in 
the policy making discourse it is frequently asserted that ‘open’ or non-market, 
non-proprietary knowledge society projects are being developed in response to 
local communities and their priorities; that is, that they are participatory and 
inclusive in both theory and practice. Research often shows however that local 
participants frequently cannot access digital information, that the information is 
decontextualized, or that it makes no sense to them. As one knowledge and 
information project officer puts it: 
 
 ‘When groups are already marginalized it seems to be increasingly that 
tools like technology become proprietary to certain people. So unless you 
set things up so the more likely to be marginalized group has access with 
intent, without that intent you are more likely to increase the fact that they 
become marginalized’ (Kleine et al., 2015: 19).  
 
As this project officer suggests, local people are often conceived as homogeneous 
‘users’ or as anonymous ‘beneficiaries’ of donor financing. Proprietary ownership 
of digital information takes precedence over open access and information 
sharing, and capacity building is often biased in favour of the needs of 
commercial ventures.  Policy interventions intended to foster knowledge 
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societies are frequently more likely to increase marginalisation, than to diminish 
it. In practice, governance from the top is present even when civil society groups 
use open source software or open digital platforms like Ushahidi or 
OpenStreetMap.  Projects may be initiated to privilege collective action and to 
value local participants, but a commercial market, instrumental technology 
diffusion model is all too often at the heart of the way a project is governed in 
practice.  This may be because of the interests of financers, the rules of donor 
organisations, or the lack of understanding of the local context by non-
governmental organisations working as intermediaries. 
 
An enormous challenge in the coming years is to explore effective ways of 
systematically researching and drawing attention to the contradictions between 
the WSIS Principles which are intended to guide knowledge societies and the 
practices of stakeholders that arise out of power asymmetries.  One approach is 
to consider the contradictory models of governance that inform knowledge 
societies developments and to examine how these inform initiatives aimed at 
achieving greater inclusion in knowledge societies on equitable terms.  
 
3. Contested Norms and Values in Knowledge Societies Models 
What are the normative foundations and the value preferences that underpin the 
way governance models treat the challenge of building knowledge societies? How 
do contradictory values and commitments on the part of different stakeholders 
play themselves out as a basis for action aimed at mobilising resources in 
knowledge societies? This section provides a schematic account of these values 
and commitments (set out in much greater detail in Imagining the Internet 
(Mansell, 2012)). The persistence of contradictory models accounts in major part 
for the enormous gaps between policy aspiration and practice.  On the one hand, 
there are empowering discourses calling for knowledge societies that bring 
advantage to the most socially and economically disadvantaged.  On the other 
hand, there is evidence that in practice governance arrangements give rise to 
practical decisions and actions that are geared towards exclusion and to 
disadvantaging those who are not already advantaged by their position in the 
socio-economic order.  
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A dominant instrumental model of knowledge society developments can be 
contrasted with critical alternative models.  These models constitute oppositional 
ways of seeing the emergence of knowledge societies and they are especially 
evident in the contemporary neoliberal capitalist order. The basic dimensions of 
these models are shown in Table 1. 
 
-------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------- 
 
At a most basic level, the dominant instrumental model for addressing the 
problems, opportunities and risks associated with societal change in knowledge 
societies focuses on how much information is being produced or on how many 
people have access to it. The main focus is on the diffusion of tools – 
infrastructure, handsets, or datasets. In contrast, critical alternative models are 
more likely to be reflexive. The primary concern is with how access to, or the 
ability to make use of, information relative to others. It is about context and the 
relevance  of information in a specific place and cultural milieu.  Alternative 
models are people centred, not thing or hardware or software, centred.   
 
The dominant instrumental model privileges the familiar information 
transmission model – the linear, sender-receiver model. This model gives some 
the comfort that comes with mathematical rigour. Invest in A such as mobile 
phones for e-money or for mapping environmental waste and pollution and then 
measure its impact on B, for instance, the citizen’s happiness score in a low 
income country. Policy makers adhering to this model tend to support a 
governance regime that looks for strong correlations between investment in 
hardware and software and measurable changes in some aspect of society.  At an 
aggregate level it yields apparently predictable outcomes. Investment is then 
allocated to replicate measureable gains in income or well-being. Critical 
alternative models are, in contrast, more concerned with the ritual or symbolic 
meaning of information, digital, or otherwise. In these models it is usually 
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recognised that digital content circulating in any medium requires 
contextualisation and that it is always interpreted in multiple ways subject to 
cultural and other factors.   
 
Moving down the list in Table 1, in the instrumental model knowledge societies 
are first and foremost about maximising individual aspiration. The governance of 
markets, other institutions and stakeholder actions is mainly aimed at ensuring 
that it is the individual agent who is enabled to choose by rationally maximising 
his or her own outcomes in the light of time and money scarcity. Digital services 
from information search to entertainment or for any other purpose (that is not 
illegal) should be responsive to individual aspiration. This contrasts with 
alternative critical models that are based on a normative foundation that values a 
dialectic or interactive relationship between individual and collective aspirations. 
The values in these models often privilege collaboration.  These values are not 
new to contemporary knowledge societies, but they are being articulated in new 
ways online.  
 
In the dominant instrumental model, control and mastery, or master-slave 
relations, such as online gateways preventing access to information, copyright 
and ownership restrictions on information, profitable business models for the 
owners of capital, privileging commercial over citizen interests, and maximising 
efficiencies in top down management, are among the primary goals. In contrast, 
the values and norms of mediated processes emphasise bottom up, or at least the 
potential for bottom up, arrangements for the production and consumption of 
digital information. Contestations over asymmetrical power relations and 
negotiation are core to these critical alternative models.  
 
The instrumental model is based on a pluralist conception of power which is 
often functionalist and descriptive and this is applied to human agency and, on 
occasion, to technological agency such that technologies are understood to have 
direct impacts on people that are uniform and often assessed without regard to 
local context.  In contrast, critical alternative models generally begin from the 
premise that unequal power relations are persistent, that they are continuously 
 8 
being replicated, that hierarchical relations are never fixed or pre-given, and that 
they can be resisted, whether through policy reform (the liberal variation of 
alternative models) or through social movement uprisings and even revolution.  
Governance arrangements that empower civil society in these models are 
deemed to be essential to benefit the vulnerable, whomever and wherever, they 
are.  These models are often associated with commons-based peer production in 
a non-market context through open development, open source software and open 
hardware (Mansell, 2013).  They may be less focused on ‘information’ itself and 
more on the symbolic meaning of a complex mix of mediated communication and 
information sharing through various means such as crowdsourcing or offline 
means of collaborative organisation.   Those who align with this model are more 
likely to be interested in how knowledge is acquired through education and 
learning, rather than in quantities of information (or data) and quantitatively 
measured outcomes. 
 
The dominant instrumental model is predicated on a set of ideas suggesting that 
if financial resources are targeted at an issue and market forces are given free 
reign, then productivity gains and economic growth eventually will trickle down 
to the disadvantaged and the excluded in knowledge societies.  Modernisation in 
the knowledge society is assumed to happen along a single uniform pathway. This 
pathway relies on finance to provide stability, a claim that has been robust over 
the past decade notwithstanding financial crises in which digital information 
circulated by banks and hedge fund managers has created instability and 
immiseration.   
 
The critical alternative models, in contrast, tend to rely on finance from voluntary 
sources or finance offered on terms that are presumed to be fairer than the costs 
of money in the commercial market, such as from donor organisations. These 
models privilege collaborative initiative, mobilizing citizens from the bottom up 
as in the case of various forms of citizen mobilisation and activism. It is assumed 
typically that constant disruptive technological change will not enable fair 
outcomes unless there is policy intervention to address asymmetrical power.  
Mobilisations of citizens arising from within these models come into conflict with 
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those who seek control from the top down. In the critical alternative models 
values may be articulated, for example, through principled stances against 
copyright restrictions, an intrusive state and commercial surveillance, the export 
of educational content from the global North to South without considering local 
cultures, and restrictions on online freedom of expression. 
 
4. Models in Discourse and Practice 
The contradictory norms and values that underpin these contending models 
result in struggles between stakeholders in knowledge societies and they 
influence governance in the form of explicit legislation and regulation as well as 
the informal norms and rules that influence ideas about how best to foster 
knowledge societies.  While these contradictory norms and values are not new to 
societies operating under capitalism, it is important to consider how these 
fundamental contradictions are playing themselves out in knowledge societies 
policy debates. Specifically, these contested norms and values influence 
stakeholder actions in numerous project and programme areas that are often 
idealised as being consistent with the WSIS aspiration for people-centred 
knowledge societies.  
 
The persistent ascendance (and re-emergence) of values consistent with the 
dominant instrumental model is what gives rise to governance that favours 
commercial markets for the exchange of individually (or corporately) owned 
digital information.  This is so despite the fact that the diffusion of new digital 
technologies often challenges conventional corporate models and puts company 
profits at risk.  It is so, additionally, despite the fact that governments are finding 
it difficult to control the circulation of digital information which they claim they 
have a right to achieve. 
 
Differences in the policy discourse can be detected between those favouring the 
instrumental model of knowledge societies and those favouring critical 
alternative models that envisage diversity, privilege local context and seek 
governance arrangements that favour collective action.  In the policy discourse on 
knowledge societies, we often find a mixture of discourses so that the values and 
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norms guiding governance are blurred or hidden and, therefore, far from 
transparent (Mansell, 2014).  For example, the priorities for WSIS-related 
knowledge societies actions often read as follows:  capacity building – enabling 
people to choose their own pathways, education and building digital literacies 
including through vocational training, transforming access to information into 
useful knowledge, and mainstreaming digital technology and service policies and 
interventions.   
 
Such priorities refer to capacity building – enabling people to choose their own 
pathways.  But ‘people’ may refer to the instrumental rational actor of the 
individualistic instrumental model, or to people in the sense of collective action 
aimed at achieving equitable outcomes.  On a high level of policy, there are 
references to education and building digital literacies in nearly every WSIS 
document and, in some, to the need not only for formal and informal training, but 
also for vocational training (Mansell & Tremblay, 2013).  At this level of 
abstraction, however, actions could embrace educational curricula that are 
imported bringing with them values and norms supporting commercial 
development and competition or curricula aimed at inculcating commons-based 
actions that are devised by and with local stakeholders. 
 
In some cases, and this was apparent in WSIS+10 documents in 2015 (CSTD, 
2015), there is reference to the need to transform access to information into 
useful knowledge.  But note the ambiguity of the terms ‘information’ and ‘useful’.  
This could be translated into an instrumental conception of quantities of 
ostensibly value free information and, for instance, algorithmic big data and 
pattern recognition initiatives to detect ‘persons of interest’.  There is no basis for 
understanding for whom the information that is accessed is meant to be useful – 
owners of capital or workers?  Alternatively, this could refer to an 
acknowledgement that the transformation of any information into knowledge is 
never related only to digital information – any such transformation occurs within 
a complex environment of existing norms, values and practices if it is to have a 
chance of providing a basis for problem solving that is meaningful to local 
stakeholders. Highly abstract priorities for knowledge societies conflate and hide 
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the norms and values that guide the governance arrangements that are shaping 
and facilitating change in practice. 
 
A further priority that frequently appears in discussions of policy for knowledge 
societies is the need to mainstream digital technology and services.  There is, 
from one point of view, a good reason for this – stakeholders who understand the 
crucial role of the mediated information and knowledge environment in every 
aspect of life – culture, sociality, economic and political endeavor, are trying to 
ensure that knowledge societies issues are on the agendas of others, not least, the 
sustainable development goals agreed in 2015.  But this also signals a problem. 
As soon as an effort is made to ‘mainstream’ knowledge societies actions, the 
potential for clashes in the normative understandings of how change can and 
should be mobilised and organised is even greater.  
 
If digital technologies in mediated knowledge societies are to play an enabling or 
empowering role and be inclusive, for instance, by empowering women, by 
protecting children’s rights, by being participatory in practice, not just in name, 
and by playing a role in enhancing people’s livelihoods in ways that are inclusive 
and equitable, then the contradictions between the norms and values embedded 
in the competing models discussed above must be brought to the forefront and 
their consequences evaluated. Mainstreaming comes with a big risk because it is 
likely to diminish the possibilities for deliberation and debate about 
contradictions in values and their consequences. This is because mainstreaming 
of digital technology and services debates means that investment in them, and the 
processes associated with their diffusion and appropriation by users, becomes 
buried under the weight of sector concerns in the energy, health, or environment 
sectors, for instance.  In these sectors, the instrumental dominant model is even 
more entrenched than it is in the digital services sector. The result of 
mainstreaming could be that the disempowering features of WSIS action 
implementation strategies become increasingly less visible as success in the 
diffusion of smart phones or access to databases in the Global north accumulates. 
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It is typically claimed that policy makers and other stakeholders should work 
towards a better balance between the competing models of how to foster 
knowledge societies. I have argued this in policy forums and reports (Mansell & 
Tremblay, 2013). Since the models are based on fundamentally contested values, 
however, it is likely that balance, as such, will not be achieved and it should not 
therefore be presented as an aspiration. Some may argue that the discourse of 
balance should be used because it is one that policy makers are familiar with and 
there is some merit in that observation.  It is also the case that critical scholars 
cannot draw policy makers’ and other stakeholders’ attention to underlying 
contradictions in the values in these models if they do not engage with 
proponents of the instrumental model. Fundamental contradictions cannot, and 
should not, be brushed away and they may be able to cohabit in a way that takes 
advantage of opportunities for advances in directions envisaged by proponents of 
critical alternative models. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) depiction of an agonistic set of 
relationships between stakeholders and their contested values is helpful in this 
respect.  Their perspective on power relations suggests that struggles will be 
punctuated by temporary ‘cease-fires’ and that momentary consensus on actions 
can restrain the excesses of the dominant instrumental model. This approach will 
not be radical enough for some, but it acknowledges the possibility that such 
moments open up spaces within the neoliberal order where shifts towards 
values, norms and practices consistent with critical alternative models of 
governance can be advanced.   
 
Stakeholder groups need to be informed about the contradictory norms and 
values embraced by different models. This means building capacities for critically 
evaluating options or strategies for action, in this instance, in relation to the 
WSIS+10 follow-up actions. Destabilization in the wake of financial crises, 
alongside global social instability visible in migrations and dislocations of peoples 
and in regional conflicts, creates agonistic opportunities to recalibrate knowledge 
societies governance so that there is greater potential to pursue norms and 
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values consistent with the critical models, that is, with equality and fairness as 
the principal goals.  
 
Conclusion 
Scholars need to give greater attention to the interdependencies between 
dominant and alternative models of change in governance arrangements for 
knowledge societies at all levels – from the very abstract high-level policy 
principles to practice-based initiatives sponsored by different stakeholders.  
Critical analysis needs to be complemented by pragmatic consideration of what is 
feasible within a given constellation of governance institutions.  This is because 
when critique is offered without suggestions for practical action, there is little 
likelihood of enabling digital technologies and information to play a positive role 
in ‘enlarging people’s choices’ (Sen, 1999). Practitioners also need to become 
more explicitly aware of the asymmetrical power dynamics embedded in digital 
technology innovation and its governance. There is an important role for critical 
researchers to explain how power asymmetries re-emerge in knowledge 
societies. It is necessary to engage with incommensurate values so as to foster 
better strategies for making the distinctions between models of knowledge 
societies more visible. Failure to develop such strategies will mean that the 
dominant instrumental model goes largely unchallenged in practice.  
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